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 In The Birth of Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche argues that science conquers art, especially 
the tragic art of the Dionysian poet of ancient Greece. This paper explores Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the unique materialism of Dionysian tragedy by considering his reflections on 
the origins of tragedy in the tragic chorus. It then turns to the Dionysian confrontation with 
science or the mind of philosophy. Nietzsche claims that the Greek tragedian embraces life in all 
its pain by indulging in the ‘craving for the ugly’ (BT 21).1 Embodied by the satyr chorus as the 
physical image of Dionysus, the ‘ugly’ is understood to be the animal passions of human beings, 
specifically their sexual drives. Appealing to the natural, primeval self that is suppressed but not 
extinguished by the knowledge of culture, Dionysian tragedy gets us in touch with our bodies 
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and its deepest longings. Tragedy, strictly speaking, invites us to feel the presence of the god and 
not simply to see or hear him. 
 Nietzsche argues that tragedy is opposed and eventually destroyed by science.2 
Associated with the ‘Socratism’ of the theoretical man, the response of science, or philosophy, to 
pain, is quite different from the response of tragedy (BT 18).3  Craving the ‘beautiful’ rather than 
the ugly, science and philosophy celebrate the human mind and the rationality of the universe 
(BT 21). Although Plato, according to Nietzsche, preserves the tragic art form in his dialogues, it 
is Euripides, another student of Socrates, who destroys the Dionysian entirely. Euripides 
destroyed Greek tragedy by bringing the demos along with their everyday reality onto the stage. 
By doing so he brought the human individual separated from their god into view. Nietzsche 
suggests that Euripides celebrated the unadorned individual because only the individual is 
intelligible or accessible to reason; he wanted art to be comprehended by mind or that it be 
rationally understood. Euripides was possessed of such a rationalizing drive, Nietzsche claims, 
because his primary audience was Socrates. It is Socrates, therefore, who is the true opponent of 
Dionysus. 
 Nietzsche turns to the origin of Greek tragedy in section 7 of The Birth of Tragedy, and 
locates the earliest manifestation of tragedy in the tragic chorus.
Tragedy as chorus and the body 
4 He denies, however, that the 
chorus has a socio-political role, representing the people of democratic Athens viewing the 
aristocratic scenes on stage (BT 56). Rather, the origins of the tragic chorus, according to 
Nietzsche, are purely religious (BT 56). To understand the religious origins of the tragic chorus, 
and thus of tragedy as such, we must first investigate the role that the chorus played in tragic 
drama. 
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 The tragic chorus, according to Nietzsche, is a group of actors usually portrayed as satyrs, 
the half-man half-goat image of the god Dionysus (BT 21, 59). The chorus is usually not on stage 
itself but at points in the drama will respond to the actors who are or speak directly to the 
audience in their seats. The chorus is thus both inside the play, when it interacts with the actors 
on stage, and outside the play when it speaks with the viewing audience. Nietzsche, appearing to 
accept Schiller’s interpretation of the role of the tragic chorus, suggests that the chorus is a 
‘living wall that tragedy constructs around itself in order to preserve its ideal domain and its 
poetical freedom’ (BT 58). The chorus, in other words, ensures that the audience views art as art 
rather than reality. Through the action of the chorus, the audience is reminded that the scene in 
front of them is fictitious and not real. 
 In modern drama a similar situation occurs when an actor breaks the dramatic illusion, 
walks forth and speaks to the audience in his or her own voice. When this happens, we know that 
we are only watching a play and that the characters, as opposed to the persons, on stage are not 
real. The chorus, therefore, like the actor in modern drama who breaks the dramatic illusion, 
divides the world of reality, represented by the audience, from the world of fiction on stage. The 
chorus separates or divides the audience from the drama in two ways. First, when the chorus 
speaks to the audience it separates the audience psychically or intellectually; it allows the 
audience to see art as art or the drama as fiction rather than reality. Second, when the chorus 
interacts with the actors on stage it separates the audience physically; the audience is excluded 
from the drama being played out between chorus and actors. 
 After apparently accepting Schiller’s interpretation of the role of the tragic chorus, 
Nietzsche raises a major problem with it. According to Nietzsche, ‘tragedy arose from the tragic 
chorus, and was originally only chorus and nothing but chorus’ (BT 56). In the earliest stages of 
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tragedy, therefore, the chorus was the actors or drama on stage, as only the chorus was present. 
Even the god Dionysus himself, of whom the satyr chorus is an image, was not present or visible, 
according to Nietzsche, in the oldest period of tragedy (BT 66). The significance of the fact that 
in the earliest form of tragic art only the chorus was present is that the audience is to the chorus 
what the chorus will be to the actors on stage in later tragedy. According to Nietzsche, the logic 
of this primitive relation is as follows: 
  The tragic chorus of the Greeks is forced to recognize 
  real beings in the figures on stage. The chorus of the  
    Oceanides really believes that it sees before it the Titan 
  Prometheus, and it considers itself as real as the god of 
  the scene. But could the highest and purest type of 
  spectator regard Prometheus as bodily present and real, 
  as the Oceanides do? Is it characteristic of the ideal 
  spectator to run onto the stage and free the god from 
  his torments? (BT 57). 
 Nietzsche suggests that the psychic and physical separation between audience and art 
maintained by the chorus in later tragedy is absent in earlier tragedy when the actors on stage 
have not appeared and all that is present is audience and chorus. In such a situation, Nietzsche 
implies, the audience fails to see art as art or cannot without difficulty distinguish between what 
is real and what is fictitious. The psychic separation is absent as art becomes life and life 
becomes art when the spectator, running on to the stage to free their god from torment, becomes 
part of the scene. Not only is the psychic separation between audience and drama absent with the 
sole presence of the chorus, but the physical separation is absent as well. According to Nietzsche, 
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‘this process of the tragic chorus is the dramatic proto-phenomenon: to see oneself transformed 
before one’s own eyes and to begin to act as if one had actually entered into another body, 
another character. This process stands at the beginning of the origin of drama’ (BT 64). As the 
audience experiences ecstatic union with the chorus, they ‘surrender their individuality’, as 
Nietzsche characterizes it, and enter into and become another character, namely their god (BT 
64). The significance, therefore, of the sole presence of the chorus at the origin of tragedy is that 
it encourages the unity of the audience with art, the spectator with the drama. 
 The audience of early tragedy could only unite physically with the chorus, however, or 
enter into another body, as it were, in a metaphorical way. What is really happening is that the 
audience see, or more likely feel, themselves in the chorus of satyrs. Thus, according to 
Nietzsche, ‘we may call the chorus in its primitive form […] the mirror image in which the 
Dionysian man contemplates himself […] The satyr chorus is […] a vision of the Dionysian 
mass of spectators’ (BT 63). Tragedy as chorus, therefore, is self-reflective; the presence of the 
satyr chorus allows the spectators to become an object to themselves both individually and 
collectively. That part of the self that the audience reflects on or feels when they imagine 
themselves united with the satyr chorus is the natural, primeval self that is suppressed but not 
extinguished by the culture of civilized life (BT 59).  
 Nietzsche gives content to this primeval nature that lies hidden beneath and is constrained 
by civilized life when he describes the satyr as one who ‘proclaims wisdom from the very heart 
of nature, a symbol of the sexual omnipotence of nature which the Greeks used to contemplate 
with reverent wonder’ (BT 61). As a symbol of the sexual omnipotence of nature in contrast to 
the ‘knowledge […] of culture’, the uncivilized, natural self that the satyr brings before and gets 
the audience to feel is their sexual nature. Nietzsche, it seems, associates our experience of 
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tragedy with the arousal of the sexual passions. Thus, whereas civilization appears grounded in 
rationality and the mind, tragic art, or the Dionysian, appears to arise from nature understood as 
sexuality and the body.5 Tragedy, Nietzsche suggests, gets civilized and cultured human beings 
in touch with their bodies and its deepest longings, longings which have been constrained but not 
extinguished by the socio-political structures within which they live.6
 After uncovering the Dionysian origins of tragedy Nietzsche turns to the rise of what he 
calls the ‘Apollinian’ aspect of tragedy. The Apollinian refers to the actual appearance, via an 
actor, of the god Dionysus on stage with dialogue (BT 67, 73). Thus, whereas in the Dionysian 
aspect of tragedy the god is felt, with the Apollinian aspect of tragedy the god is seen and heard 
(BT 66-67). The Apollinian is the direct visual and verbal presence of the god Dionysus himself, 
who, Nietzsche claims, was the first character to appear on stage when tragedy developed 
beyond the tragic chorus (BT 73). Moreover, as Dionysus was the first character of Greek 
tragedy, its sole theme for a long time was the ‘sufferings of Dionysus’ (BT 73). Yet, it is 
reasonable to ask: why is Dionysus suffering? Why is a god in pain? In other words, why is 
Dionysus associated with tragedy rather than comedy or epic? 
 
 Nietzsche argues that Dionysus is the suffering god because the existence of an 
intelligible universe means that he is a dismembered god. Nietzsche gives clarity to what is 
meant by Dionysus as the dismembered god when he says: 
The cosmos and the suffering god 
  In truth […] the hero [of tragedy] is the suffering Dionysus 
  of the Mysteries, the god experiencing in himself the  
  agonies of individuation, of whom wonderful myths tell 
  that as a boy he was torn to pieces by the Titans and now 
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  is worshipped in this state as Zagreus. Thus it is intimated 
  that this dismemberment, the properly Dionysian suffering, 
  is like a transformation into air, water, earth, and fire, that 
  we are therefore to regard the state of individuation as the  
  origin and primal cause of all suffering, as something  
  objectionable in itself. From the smile of this Dionysus 
  sprang the Olympian gods, from his tears sprang man. In 
  this existence as a dismembered god, Dionysus possesses 
  the dual nature of a cruel, barbarized demon and a mild, 
  gentle ruler’ (BT 73). 
 Nietzsche indicates that according to Greek myth the process of the god’s 
dismemberment—the separation or individuation of his being—is the creation of the universe. 
The image that Nietzsche draws is that before the cosmos comes into being, what exists is 
unified, undifferentiated matter. This undifferentiated mass of matter can be understood as the 
god Dionysus in his original condition. The god, however, is then torn to pieces or individuated, 
as Nietzsche would say, which can be understood as the process of creation. After this creative 
action, there exist a number of particular and therefore intelligible beings in the cosmos, such as 
Olympian gods, human beings, animals, plants, and the elements earth, air, fire and water. All of 
these particular pieces of the whole are actually the body of Dionysus separated or alienated 
from itself. The suffering of Dionysus, therefore, is caused by his dismemberment, which is also 
the Greek story of the coming into being and continuation of an intelligible universe. 
In relation to sexuality—the presence of the suffering Dionysus in us—our bodily 
longing for union with another body seems to reflect our longing for the original unity of matter 
8 
 
that we believe existed before our world came into being. Thus, in our ecstatic desire to free 
Dionysus from his sufferings we reflect our deepest wish to return into an undifferentiated 
material being prior to the creation of the cosmos.7 The ultimate but unachievable aim of 
sexuality, therefore, seems to be the fusing of our material existence into matter as a whole, such 
that all matter or body would come together in a way that would destroy our world. In this sense 
sexuality desires to transcend all limits or boundaries, not just moral boundaries but also 
physical-factual boundaries. Thus, Nietzsche says of the rapture of the Dionysian state that it is 
the ‘annihilation of ordinary bounds and limits of existence’ (BT 59). Sexuality, in other words, 
points to the desire to crush together all individuated matter, such that human is fused into 
human, humanity into trees, trees into earth, and so on, until we are left without form and shape 
in one undifferentiated mass of material. In such a state the cosmos would be unintelligible as 
matter can only be grasped by thought when it is individuated into particular shapes. Intrinsic in 
our experience of sexuality, therefore, is pain at and perhaps even rebellion against an intelligible 
universe. One might be tempted to say that for Nietzsche, sexuality is inherently anti-rational. 
 Greek tragedy, Nietzsche argues, is confronted by and eventually dies under the glare of 
the ‘Socratism […] of the theoretical man’ (BT 18). Euripides, a student of Socrates and himself 
a tragic poet, is crucial, according to Nietzsche, to the disappearance of the Dionysian. 
The mind and the death of tragedy 
 The problem with Euripides is that he ‘brought the spectator onto the stage’ (BT 77). 
Provisionally, Nietzsche means that Euripides portrayed the demos, or the common ‘everyday 
man’ with his common, everyday reality, in the drama. Penetrating more deeply into Euripides’ 
tendencies Nietzsche claims that he finds two additional ‘spectators’ brought on to the tragic 
stage. The first of these is ‘Euripides himself, [but] Euripides as thinker, not as poet’ (BT 80). 
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Nietzsche suggests that Euripides, using his mind as a thinker rather than his passions as a poet, 
puts the human individual as an individuated piece of matter which speaks, or has logos, onto to 
the stage. This individual is separated and completely cut off from its god, which is the universal, 
undifferentiated matter that the tragic hero was a ‘mask’ for in earlier tragedy. In Euripides, the 
tragic hero represents an individual human being as an individual human being, and nothing 
deeper. In other words, the Euripidean tragic hero is completely Apollinian without any 
connection to the Dionysian from which the Apollinian originated.  
Euripides puts this solely Apollinian individual at the center of his drama because, 
according to Nietzsche, he insisted that art be rationally comprehended by nous, or the intellect 
(BT 85). He therefore celebrates the unadorned individual because only the individual is 
accessible to reason. Since there are no ‘ideas’ in the Platonic sense for Euripides, it is only 
individuated pieces of matter with logos which can be thought or comprehended. The 
undifferentiated matter of Dionysus, or the primeval chaos that exists prior to nous, is completely 
unintelligible; it cannot be thought but only felt through sexuality. 
 Euripides desired to make tragedy completely rational, thereby causing its demise, 
because Socrates was the second of the two additional spectators brought to bear on the tragic 
stage by Euripides (BT 86). Because it is as a follower of Socrates that Euripides banishes the 
Dionysian from the tragic stage, Nietzsche claims that is Socrates who is the true opponent of 
Dionysus. 
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